I figured I would start a thread on Sudan, focusing a bit on the current fighting between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), various other militias involved (there are a bunch, hopefully this avoids getting bogged down in an alphabet soup), the humanitarian situation, and other political bits that catch my interest. This is just me reading and interpreting news - I could be totally wrong and missing key context, though I'll do my best. I'll start with a short version of my understanding of the current conflict.
I've read and watched various sources for the information in this post (and they will undoubtedly influence later posts as well). I can't provide exact citations, unfortunately, but here are the sources I looked at:
Local reporting that I try to follow:
Dabanga
Sudan Tribune
Background on the end of Al-Bashir's regime:
New Yorker interview
The RSF's and SAF's sources of funding in Sudan's economy:
C4ADS report on foreign funding
C4ADS Breaking the Bank report
I am also reading Sudan: The Failure and Division of an African State, Second Edition by Richard Cockett. It does not cover the current conflict as it ends in 2016 (I believe the 1st edition ended in 2011). This book is more focused on Darfur and the conflict with what became South Sudan but it provides a lot of context that I am finding helpful, giving a better sense of the geography and economy of the region, as well as fleshing out people and factions that are still relevant.
Background for the Current Fighting
I'm going to trace it back to 2003 in Darfur. When President Omar al-Bashir was forced to change strategies in fighting the rebels in Darfur, he turned to a strategy that had been used in the Nuba mountains of Sudan in the 1990s by exploiting the tension between nomadic Arab tribes and the settled African villages and towns of the region. The arms provided to the Arab tribes created the militias called the Janjaweed. Al-Bashir decided in 2013 to formally reorganize these militias into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that would eventually report directly to him. It is generally accepted that al-Bashir was looking to the RSF to serve as a counterweight to the SAF in an effort to avoid being deposed.
Those plans ultimately didn't work out. In April 2019, amid widespread public protests, President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown as the RSF and SAF decided to side with the protestors and oust the long-lasting dictator. This led to a process where a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, was appointed to run the government alongside military leaders, with a goal of preparing the country for an election.
To that end, the government had a mandate to sever ties between remnants of the Bashir regime and the Sudanese economy, and they created the Regime Dismantlement Committee to do just that: investigate to discover those ties, dissolve them, and recover any assets they could in the process. This process was supported by the elites from the former regime who had joined the transitional government; however, it became apparent that this cooperation was being used to ensure that the committee did not touch the assets of these supporters. As time passed, the delay of these investigations became impossible to ignore and led to growing tensions between the committee, the military, and those who wanted the committee to tackle all of these ties to complete the process of transitioning to a civilian government.
These tensions came to a head in October 2021, when the military seized power from the government. Sudanese and international protest led General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to reach an agreement with Hamdok to resume a government split between military and civilian rule. I haven't read much detail on that agreement other than it ended up failing on the issue of integrating the RSF into the SAF. It was probably inevitable that al-Burhan and Hemedti, the leaders of their respective armed forces, would clash over who would be in charge but this negotiation point sparked that conflict.
There is also a class and ethnic component to this conflict. Here's how Mai Hassan, an associate professor of political science at MIT, explained this in 2023:
Foreign Involvement
The UAE has been accused of supplying weapons and drones to the RSF, possibly with the aid of Russia's Wagner Group (both sides have claimed that the other side is seeking aid from Wagner, while Wagner claimed it was not in Sudan any longer). In September 2023, the New York Times reported that an airfield and hospital in Amdjarass in Chad that was supposedly being used for humanitarian purposes was actually in use by UAE to ferry weapons and drones to the RSF and to treat their wounded soldiers. This hospital is also claimed to house a drone hanger and is used to launch Chinese drones that have a range of 1,000 miles, as well as a weapons bunker. RSF soldiers had been sent to fight the Houthi in Yemen in 2018; this might account for the interest the UAE has in Sudan, in addition to gold in the country and the possibility of building ports on the Red Sea.
Russia has provided weapons to both sides of the war, though this support has possibly shifted to favor the SAF. It is not clear why this has shifted - there is a deal for Russia to gain a naval base on the Red Sea, but that was signed in 2020 so I'm not sure if that is the deciding factor. Supposedly the SAF is open to Russian involvement in the country while the RSF is not.
It appears that Iran has been supplying drones to the SAF, apparently in an effort to gain access to the Red Sea and to fight against the influence of the UAE in the country.
Present Day
So that brings me to recent news stories that I find interesting in the region. The SAF (as the government of Sudan) has filed a case with the International Court of Justice against the UAE over their support for the RSF against the Masalit people in Darfur. The UAE is seeking a dismissal and accusing the SAF of using this filing to distract attention from their failure to seek a ceasefire and ultimately a political solution to the fighting.
In response to al-Burhan's recent announcement that a civilian transitional government is being planned, the RSF is creating a "parallel" government in the regions it (and its allies) control; I often see this called the "Government of Peace and Unity". There is a proposal to merge the armed forces of the different groups that have signed on but the leaders of some of those groups have said that will only happen after a comprehensive peace is made with the SAF. It also calls for the dissolution of the SAF and its associated militias, continuing the original issue of which armed force gets to exist (and likely rule the country). The creation of this government has raised concerns about the country being partitioned.
I've read and watched various sources for the information in this post (and they will undoubtedly influence later posts as well). I can't provide exact citations, unfortunately, but here are the sources I looked at:
Local reporting that I try to follow:
Dabanga
Sudan Tribune
Background on the end of Al-Bashir's regime:
New Yorker interview
The RSF's and SAF's sources of funding in Sudan's economy:
C4ADS report on foreign funding
C4ADS Breaking the Bank report
I am also reading Sudan: The Failure and Division of an African State, Second Edition by Richard Cockett. It does not cover the current conflict as it ends in 2016 (I believe the 1st edition ended in 2011). This book is more focused on Darfur and the conflict with what became South Sudan but it provides a lot of context that I am finding helpful, giving a better sense of the geography and economy of the region, as well as fleshing out people and factions that are still relevant.
Background for the Current Fighting
I'm going to trace it back to 2003 in Darfur. When President Omar al-Bashir was forced to change strategies in fighting the rebels in Darfur, he turned to a strategy that had been used in the Nuba mountains of Sudan in the 1990s by exploiting the tension between nomadic Arab tribes and the settled African villages and towns of the region. The arms provided to the Arab tribes created the militias called the Janjaweed. Al-Bashir decided in 2013 to formally reorganize these militias into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group that would eventually report directly to him. It is generally accepted that al-Bashir was looking to the RSF to serve as a counterweight to the SAF in an effort to avoid being deposed.
Those plans ultimately didn't work out. In April 2019, amid widespread public protests, President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown as the RSF and SAF decided to side with the protestors and oust the long-lasting dictator. This led to a process where a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, was appointed to run the government alongside military leaders, with a goal of preparing the country for an election.
To that end, the government had a mandate to sever ties between remnants of the Bashir regime and the Sudanese economy, and they created the Regime Dismantlement Committee to do just that: investigate to discover those ties, dissolve them, and recover any assets they could in the process. This process was supported by the elites from the former regime who had joined the transitional government; however, it became apparent that this cooperation was being used to ensure that the committee did not touch the assets of these supporters. As time passed, the delay of these investigations became impossible to ignore and led to growing tensions between the committee, the military, and those who wanted the committee to tackle all of these ties to complete the process of transitioning to a civilian government.
These tensions came to a head in October 2021, when the military seized power from the government. Sudanese and international protest led General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to reach an agreement with Hamdok to resume a government split between military and civilian rule. I haven't read much detail on that agreement other than it ended up failing on the issue of integrating the RSF into the SAF. It was probably inevitable that al-Burhan and Hemedti, the leaders of their respective armed forces, would clash over who would be in charge but this negotiation point sparked that conflict.
There is also a class and ethnic component to this conflict. Here's how Mai Hassan, an associate professor of political science at MIT, explained this in 2023:
To my understanding, the opinion in the country on Hemedti has changed for the worse due to the actions of the RSF. There is a lot of dislike against al-Burhan and the SAF, but it seems Hemedti and the RSF are viewed as the bigger threat due to the lack of discipline and control of their soldiers. Both sides commit war crimes but RSF seems to do so more often and more unpredictably.
Foreign Involvement
The UAE has been accused of supplying weapons and drones to the RSF, possibly with the aid of Russia's Wagner Group (both sides have claimed that the other side is seeking aid from Wagner, while Wagner claimed it was not in Sudan any longer). In September 2023, the New York Times reported that an airfield and hospital in Amdjarass in Chad that was supposedly being used for humanitarian purposes was actually in use by UAE to ferry weapons and drones to the RSF and to treat their wounded soldiers. This hospital is also claimed to house a drone hanger and is used to launch Chinese drones that have a range of 1,000 miles, as well as a weapons bunker. RSF soldiers had been sent to fight the Houthi in Yemen in 2018; this might account for the interest the UAE has in Sudan, in addition to gold in the country and the possibility of building ports on the Red Sea.
Russia has provided weapons to both sides of the war, though this support has possibly shifted to favor the SAF. It is not clear why this has shifted - there is a deal for Russia to gain a naval base on the Red Sea, but that was signed in 2020 so I'm not sure if that is the deciding factor. Supposedly the SAF is open to Russian involvement in the country while the RSF is not.
It appears that Iran has been supplying drones to the SAF, apparently in an effort to gain access to the Red Sea and to fight against the influence of the UAE in the country.
Present Day
So that brings me to recent news stories that I find interesting in the region. The SAF (as the government of Sudan) has filed a case with the International Court of Justice against the UAE over their support for the RSF against the Masalit people in Darfur. The UAE is seeking a dismissal and accusing the SAF of using this filing to distract attention from their failure to seek a ceasefire and ultimately a political solution to the fighting.
In response to al-Burhan's recent announcement that a civilian transitional government is being planned, the RSF is creating a "parallel" government in the regions it (and its allies) control; I often see this called the "Government of Peace and Unity". There is a proposal to merge the armed forces of the different groups that have signed on but the leaders of some of those groups have said that will only happen after a comprehensive peace is made with the SAF. It also calls for the dissolution of the SAF and its associated militias, continuing the original issue of which armed force gets to exist (and likely rule the country). The creation of this government has raised concerns about the country being partitioned.
